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legal support of British human rights lawyers and the assistance of the 
diaspora in Europe, human rights lawyers in Diyarbakır successfully 
petitioned the Strasbourg Court. The ECtHR’s judgments against Turkey 
documented the state of terror reigning on civilians in the Kurdish 
region and displayed the regime of impunity shielding perpetrators 
against accountability.
Although the facts established by the ECtHR served to discredit 
Turkey’s official narrative on the Kurdish question (that its security 
forces did not engage in wrongful conduct but merely fought 
terrorists), the democratization and reform processes have only started 
after the initiation of the EU accession process. It was the prospect 
of joining the Union, not a fundamental shift in the Turkish state’s 
approach or the Turkish society’s thinking vis-à-vis the Kurds and the 
Kurdish question, that triggered the transition. Just like in the post-
World War II era when Turkey became one of the early members of 
the United Nations and the Council of Europe and ratified their human 
rights treaties in an effort to be part of the “civilized world” or in the late 
1980s when the Turgut Özal government granted Turkish citizens the 
right to petition the ECtHR in a diplomatic move to enhance Turkey’s 
chances for EU membership, the advancement of democracy and the 
protection of human rights were perceived by the society at large 
as bitter pills that needed to be swallowed for achieving economic 
prosperity and international recognition. It had become increasingly 
clear that the state’s oppression against the Kurds stood in the way 
of EU membership, which would bring economic growth, social 
development and a better quality of life. For the Turkish mindset, 
granting Kurds “a few rights” was a concession worth making in the 
name of being accepted into the club of developed nations.
It would become increasingly apparent, however, that the Kurds would 
not settle for little. Certainly, up until the early 2000s, when select 
provinces in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern region were governed 
by a discriminatory legal regime based on a state of emergency, 
the Kurds’ demands were by and large limited to the protection of 
their first generation rights. At a time when acts of torture, political 
disappearances, forced displacements and extrajudicial killings by 
state security officials and paramilitary groups were virtually daily 
incidents, the priority for the Kurdish activists and the pro-PKK political 
movement was the cessation of human rights violations and the 
return to normalcy. For European institutions, these were legitimate 
and rightful demands that Turkey was obliged to meet in order to 
enter the EU and to abide by its commitments undertaken in the 
Council of Europe. For the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) government which was elected to office in 
November 2002 on a pro-EU agenda, the political cost of meeting 
the Kurds’ demands for the abolishment of state security courts, the 
adoption of procedural safeguards for the prevention of torture, and 
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the Kurds to develop a “home grown” solution to the conflict. While 
the “peace process” launched by the government in late 2012 raises 
hopes for a peaceful settlement, the mismatch between the parties’ 
expectations render it extremely fragile. 
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judgments on the novel issues they brought before the ECtHR also 
failed. Asking the Court to condemn extrajudicial killings was one 
thing, winning a judgment against Turkey’s high electoral threshold 
and ban on the use of the Kurdish alphabet was another.3  Kurdish 
lawyers failed in their efforts to push the boundaries of the individual 
rights protected under the European Convention to have their group 
rights and cultural rights recognized. It has also become increasingly 
clear that there was a substantive limit to the support the Kurds could 
realistically expect from the EU and that they were fast approaching it.
Redirecting the struggle to the national arena 
By the late 2000s, the growing mismatch between Kurdish demands 
and European institutions’ ability and/or willingness to support them 
has led the Kurds to channel their resources to the national level. In 
contrast to their legal mobilization in the 1990s, the Kurdish struggle 
in the 2000s focused predominantly on politics. The change also owed 
to a growing realization that the AKP-led democratization process in 
Turkey would not, in the short term, bring structural legislative and 
constitutional reforms to the benefit of the Kurds. It was clear that the 
national electoral threshold would remain at 10 percent during the 
next few elections and the old Kurdish names of places would not be 
restored. The Kurds developed political strategies to circumvent the 
legal framework on the one hand and to engage in civil disobedience 
on the other. In 2007, the Kurdish political movement for the first time 
sent deputies to the parliament by participating in national elections 
with individual candidates, to whom the electoral threshold does not 
apply. The pursuit of the same strategy in the 2011 elections increased 
the number of independent deputies supported by the pro-Kurdish 
Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP) led 
bloc. Also increasing its votes in the 2009 local elections, the BDP 
enhanced its hold on the administration of key provincial and district 
municipalities in the Kurdish region, strengthening its position as the 
AKP’s sole rival for Kurdish votes.
Making use of its growing political power, the Kurdish movement 
pushed the boundaries of the democratization process. The 
government’s attempts to solely define and limit the contours of 
the reforms were rendered futile by the BDP’s civil disobedience 
campaigns at the local and national level. The BDP-run municipalities 
pursued bilingual and multilingual policies, in blatant violation of the 
laws, through restoring the old Kurdish names of places, providing 
municipal services in Kurdish and other minority languages and 
Human Rights. Implementing Strasbourg’s Judgments on Domestic Policy, Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
3 While the ECtHR acknowledged that the 10 percent electoral threshold in 
Turkey was the highest in Europe, it held that member states have a wide margin 
of appreciation on this matter owing to the lack of common practice in European 
countries and the political nature of electoral rights. ECtHR, Judgment of the Grand 
Chamber on the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey (Application No. 10226/03), 8 July 
2008, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87363. In another 
case concerning Turkey’s ban on the use of x, q and w, letters not present in the 
Turkish alphabet, the Court also ruled in favour of the government. ECtHR, Judgment 
on the case of Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey (Applications Nos. 30206/04, 
37038/04, 43681/04, 45376/04, 12881/05, 28697/05, 32797/05 and 45609/05), 2 
February 2010, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97088.
the removal of the restrictions on freedom of expression, association 
and press was tolerable when weighed against the gains it would 
bring. Bringing an end to the systematic human rights abuses in the 
Kurdish region would not only facilitate the initiation of accession talks 
with the EU and decrease the number of ECtHR judgments against 
Turkey, but would also strengthen and legitimize the government’s 
position at home vis-à-vis the military which still perceived itself as the 
primary repository of political power.
During its first term in office, the AKP government adopted a number 
of reforms to grant the Kurds their long denied rights. In addition to 
general human rights reforms called for by the ECtHR, the government 
granted the Kurds limited language rights to fulfill the EU’s accession 
criteria. And it was one of these criteria, “respect for and protection of 
minorities”, that gave Kurdish activists inspiration for the next phase 
of their struggle. By the mid-2000s, a mere guarantee of their first 
generation rights was no longer adequate for the Kurds. They now 
demanded group rights and cultural rights – the right to mother 
tongue education, the right to change the forcefully Turkified names 
of geographical places back to their Kurdish names, the right to name 
their children Kurdish names entailing q, x and w, letters lacking 
in the Turkish alphabet. The Council of Europe’s little known legal 
instruments, the Framework Convention for National Minorities and 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which the 
EU asked the candidate countries to ratify before accession, provided 
new opportunities for mobilization. Kurdish activists followed a multi-
tier approach, bringing before the ECtHR cases raising novel issues, 
calling on the EU to pressure the government to grant Kurds their 
cultural rights, and raising societal awareness on minority rights.
By the 2000s, however, mobilizing the European public opinion 
around the Kurdish cause proved to be much more difficult compared 
to the 1990s. The past decade had witnessed drastic political changes 
at the national and international level. Though human rights violations 
continued and Turkey was far from being a genuine democracy, there 
was an undeniably significant progress in the democratization of 
the regime. Europe, too, had changed. The sudden expansion of the 
Council of Europe with the entry of the formerly communist Central 
and Eastern European countries resulted in an exponential increase in 
the workload of the ECtHR, rendering the Court much less accessible. 
Among the reforms introduced to ease the ECtHR’s case load was the 
pilot judgment procedure, a form of power sharing between the Court 
and governments.1  In view of its docket crisis and in recognition of the 
reform process in Turkey, the ECtHR became more deferential to the 
government in its choice of the domestic remedies needed to execute 
the Court’s judgments and to prevent future violations. The new 
global legal and political order of the post- September 11th period, 
too, had consequences for Turkey’s and the Kurds’ relations with the 
EU. Preoccupied with their own “war on terror”, the EU and its member 
states became much less tolerant of an armed “national liberation 
movement”, as evident in their inclusion of the PKK among the list of 
terrorist organizations and frequent declarations of support for Turkey 
in its fight against the PKK. Finally, the lack of a common standard 
in the member states’ policies on minority protection made the EU 
increasingly reluctant to support the Kurdish movements’ demands for 
cultural and group rights.
The implication of these developments for Kurdish activists has 
been drastic. They no longer had an easily accessible Strasbourg 
which would tolerate procedural errors and make exceptions to the 
rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies.2  Their attempts to win 
1 According to the pilot judgment procedure, the ECtHR no longer decides on the 
merits of each admissible case; rather, as far as structural problems raising identical 
issues are concerned, the Court issues judgment in one application, rejects remaining 
similar petitions and leaves it to the national government at issue to decide on the 
kinds of legislative reforms needed to solve the problem. This new approach was 
based on the new mandate granted to the Court by the Committee of Ministers 
(CoM) of the Council of Europe. See Committee of Ministers, Recommendation on the 
improvement of domestic remedies (Rec(2004)6), 12 May 2004, https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=743317.
2 Dilek Kurban and Haldun Gülalp, “A Complicated Affair: Turkey’s Kurds and the 
European Court of Human Rights”, in Dia Anagnostou (ed.), The European Court of 
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requiring fluency in the Kurdish language in recruitment for public 
service. In protest against the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (Diyanet 
İşleri Başkanlığı) refusal to provide religious services in Kurdish in the 
region, the BDP organized mass Friday prayers in public squares. 
The steps taken by the government as part of the “Kurdish opening” 
launched by the Prime Minister in 2009 proved to be too little, too 
late. The launch of TRT Şeş, a public television channel with 24 hours 
exclusive Kurdish broadcasting, meant little for the Kurds who have for 
years been following the world in Kurdish through the Europe-based 
Roj TV. The opening of Kurdish language departments at universities, 
likewise, was perceived as an insufficient measure in light of the 
Kurds’ expectation for mother tongue education starting from pre-
school. The most significant step taken by the government as part of 
the “Kurdish opening” was to allow the return to Turkey of eight PKK 
militants4  from Iraqi Kurdistan through crossing the Habur border gate 
on 19 October 2009. The welcoming of the group by tens of thousands 
of Kurds on the Turkish side of the border caused a nationalist backlash 
on the part of the CHP and MHP, which accused the government of 
“giving in to terrorism” and allowing the BDP to “propagate terrorism.” 
Amid these protests, the AKP stepped back and effectively brought 
the Kurdish opening to an end.
What has consumed the AKP government’s credibility and 
trustworthiness in the eyes of the Kurds, however, was not its 
belatedness in granting linguistic rights. Rather, it was the detention on 
remand of thousands of Kurdish politicians, mayors, activists, lawyers 
and journalists under the pretext of preventing the PKK’s domination 
of civil politics in the Kurdish region. Suspects were accused of being 
leaders or members of the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma 
Ciwakên Kurdistan-KCK), the alleged urban branch of the PKK. In 2011, 
the number of defendants reached thousands, many of whom were 
held in pretrial detention for periods ranging from 15 months to two 
years.5  The timing of the first arrests, two weeks after the March 2009 
municipal elections, was interpreted by the Kurds as the proof of the 
AKP’s intention to penalize the Kurds for having voted for the BDP. 
Virtually every active member of the Kurdish political movement, with 
the exception of parliamentarians shielded with political immunity, 
was placed behind bars in the name of anti-terrorism. The draconian 
provisions of the Anti-Terror Law and Penal Law, as “reformed” by the 
government in 2005 and 2006, provided the legal basis for the witch 
hunt conducted by the police intelligence under the disguise of 
court-ordered investigations. The PKK militants and Kurdish refugees 
who had returned to Turkey in a gesture of good will to support the 
government’s “opening” also fell victim to Turkey’s expansive anti-terror 
laws. In 2010, only months after their return, four PKK militants and six 
refugees were detained on remand on charges of “acting on behalf 
of a terrorist organization”. The remaining 24 individuals subsequently 
crossed the border back and returned to Iraqi Kurdistan.6 
The AKP government’s mishaps have led the BDP-led Kurdish 
political movement to increase the stakes for a democratic solution. 
Mother tongue education, the revision of the Anti-Terror Law and 
the Penal Code, the lowering of the 10 percent electoral threshold, 
a fairer distribution of the Treasury’s assistance to political parties and 
constitutional guarantees for cultural rights were no longer sufficient; 
all KCK prisoners should be immediately released and the Kurds 
4 Accompanying the PKK militants were 26 Kurdish civilians who had been living at 
the Mahmour refugee camp since their forced displacement in the 1990s.
5 In reality, there are a number of interrelated Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma 
Ciwakên Kurdistan-KCK) cases. The prosecutorial investigation against the suspects 
started in May 2007. The first police operation was carried out on 14 April 2009, 
followed by others in 2009 and early 2010, resulting in the apprehension of thousands 
of suspects and the detention of hundreds. It was only on 9 June 2010, when the 
indictment was issued, that defendants were formally informed of the charges against 
them. As of October 2010, there were ten separate but related KCK cases in the 
following provinces: Diyarbakır (hosting the principal KCK case), Batman (hosting two 
separate cases), Şırnak, Mardin, Van, Adana (hosting two separate cases), Mersin and 
Gaziantep. Information based on the legal brief presented by defendants’ counsel to 
the Diyarbakır Sixth Heavy Penal Court with Special Powers, 18 October 2010.
6 Cengiz Çandar, ‘Leaving the Mountain’: How may the PKK Lay Down Arms? Freeing 
the Kurdish Question from Violence, Istanbul, TESEV, 2012, http://www.tesev.org.tr/en/
publications/1/1.
should be granted “democratic autonomy” as an assurance of self-
rule in virtually all spheres of public life, with the exception of foreign 
policy, economy and national defence. The AKP’s categorical refusal 
to negotiate over these demands led the BDP bloc to vote against 
the constitutional reform package submitted to parliament in March 
2010, which failed to receive the requisite two-thirds majority and 
was therefore submitted to popular referendum on 12 September 
2010. To show its weight as a political partner, the BDP called on its 
constituencies to boycott the referendum. Though the package was 
approved by 57 per cent of the votes, a significant portion of the 
electorate in the predominantly Kurdish provinces did not participate 
in the ballot.7 
Encouraged by the support it received in the 2010 referendum, the AKP 
entered the general elections of June 2011 with a promise to adopt a 
new constitution based on inter-party consensus. The AKP’s reelection 
with 47 percent of the vote was a clear signal that Turkey was ready 
for its first civil and democratic constitution. The AKP’s establishment 
of a special commission with the equal representation of four political 
parties represented in parliament provided the BDP with the historic 
opportunity to play a key role in Turkey’s democratization. The various 
political factions within the Kurdish liberation movement and Kurdish 
civil society were for the first time unequivocally united around the same 
constitutional demands and behind the BDP. Taking the constitutional 
process seriously, various Kurdish groups and parties presented to 
the parliamentary commission their common demands for mother 
tongue education, decentralization and the redefinition of citizenship. 
While these demands had a divisive effect on the commission, it was 
the proposal the AKP introduced in late 2012 for changing Turkey’s 
regime from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system that 
caused a political crisis within the commission (and in the parliament). 
The centre left and secularist Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi-CHP) and the right-wing nationalist Nationalist Movement 
Party (Milliyetçi Halk Partisi-MHP) staunchly opposed the proposal on 
the grounds that it was tailored to cater to Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
personal career and would lead to an authoritarian regime. The BDP, 
instead, signaled its support for a presidential system in exchange for 
the AKP’s backing of their political demands.
In the meantime, the Kurdish political movement started a new civil 
disobedience campaign in protest against the deadlock in the KCK 
cases due to the courts’ refusal to allow the defendants to conduct 
their legal defence in Kurdish. In one of the largest hunger strikes in 
Turkish history initiated on 12 September 2012 by 63 prisoners, the 
number of participants reached 682 prisoners8 by early November. 
The strikers had three demands: the alleviation of Öcalan’s prison 
conditions, the right to education in Kurdish and the right to use 
Kurdish in courts.9 The duration of the strike and the participation of 
BDP deputies and leaders in it increased its public profile, forcing the 
government to acknowledge the problem and take action. Soon after 
the Minister of Justice announced that the government was preparing 
a new law granting the use of Kurdish in courts,  and Öcalan made a 
call from his prison cell for an immediate end to the strikes. In response 
to this call, the strikes abruptly ended on 18 November. The incident 
was interpreted by many as a sign of the strength of the Kurdish 
political movement and Öcalan’s omnipotence over it.
The “peace process” 
It was against this background that the AKP initiated the ongoing 
“peace process” to end the nearly 30 years of war with the PKK. Soon 
7 The turnout rate in some of the Kurdish cities was: Hakkari, 9,1 percent; Diyarbakır, 
35,2 percent; Batman, 40,3 percent; Şırnak, 22,5 percent; Van, 43,6 percent. The 
nationwide turnout average was 77,4 percent.
8 The number is based on the announcement made by the Ministry of Justice on 2 
November 2012.
9 The law was eventually adopted on 24 January 2013, granting defendants a limited 
right of oral defence in “another language” other than Turkish during the reading 
of the indictment and in response to the substantive allegations. Defendants are 
required to bear the costs themselves. The law entered into effect with its publication 
in the Official Gazette on 31 January 2013.
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after Öcalan’s call to end the strikes, in December 2012, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan disclosed that the National Intelligence Organization had 
reinitiated talks with the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan. 
What brought the government back to the dialogue with Öcalan was 
a combination of multiple factors. First was a growing realization of 
the futility of an exclusive “law and order” approach to the Kurdish 
question, particularly since the PKK had escalated the war in recent 
years and launched fatal attacks targeting soldiers, police, public 
servants and civilians. Second was the inadequacy of the AKP’s 
parliamentary representation for submitting a draft constitution to 
popular referendum in the likelihood of the collapse of the inter-party 
process. Third and related was the threat that a dragging Kurdish 
question would pose for Erdoğan’s personal career plans of being 
elected as president with increased powers. Finally was the critical role 
played by the Syrian Kurds and the PKK’s Syrian faction in the war in 
Syria, where the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region looks 
highly probable.
This time, to share the potential political costs of another failed peace 
attempt or to enhance its chances of success, the AKP government 
included the BDP into the talks with Öcalan by permitting two 
consecutive delegations of BDP deputies to visit Öcalan in the island 
prison of İmralı within a matter of two months. The inclusion of the 
BDP into the process stood in sharp contrast to 2009, when the talks 
with Öcalan were exclusively carried out by the Intelligence and the 
government refused the demands of the Kurdish political movement 
to be involved.
The government and the Kurdish political movement have divergent 
expectations from the ongoing process. For the government, 
the ultimate aim is the cessation of armed conflict, and the PKK’s 
withdrawal beyond Turkey’s borders and laying down arms. For the 
Kurdish political movement, the goal is to find a democratic solution to 
the Kurdish question based on structural constitutional and legislative 
reforms to grant the Kurds political status and equal rights. The leaked 
minutes of the meeting between Öcalan and the BDP delegation on 23 
February 2013 make clear that Öcalan has no intention to immediately 
and unconditionally call on its troops to lay down their arms. Rather, 
he envisions a long term process where the two parties will gradually 
take coordinated and consecutive steps towards an eventual peace 
settlement. As a first step, Öcalan, through letters delivered by the BDP 
delegation to the PKK leadership in Europe and the Kandil Mountain 
in Iraqi Kurdistan, called on the PKK to release the soldiers and public 
servants it holds in captivity.10  It also appears that Öcalan has asked 
the PKK to announce a ceasefire on Newroz, the Kurdish New Year 
celebrated on March 21st, as a gesture of good will and sign of support 
for the new process. He also made clear, however, that any further 
positive step on the part of the PKK will be contingent on the ways in 
which the government will respond to the ceasefire.
In this respect, the long delayed “fourth judicial package”, which is 
expected to introduce significant improvements for the protection of 
political freedoms, bears particular importance. It is the expectation of 
the Kurdish political movement and the Kurdish society at large that 
the package will facilitate the release of KCK defendants.11  While the 
courts, seemingly instructed by the Ministry of Justice, released in early 
10 At the time of the writing of this brief, preparations were under way for the 
captives’ handover to a delegation of human rights activists and BDP deputies.
11 While the courts, seemingly instructed by the Ministry of Justice, released in early 
March 2013 a few Kurdish mayors, thousands of other KCK defendants remain in 
prison.
March 2013 a few Kurdish mayors, thousands of other KCK defendants 
remain in prison. However, the fourth judicial reform package the 
government introduced to the parliament after the second BDP-
Öcalan meeting fell far short of meeting these expectations.12  At the 
time of writing of this brief, it remains uncertain whether and how the 
government will respond to the criticisms concerning the content of 
the package.
Certainly, the AKP government and the Prime Minister took an 
extremely high risk in initiating new talks with Öcalan and tasking the 
BDP with facilitating the dialogue. However, there is a fundamental 
problem in the way in which the government frames the expected 
outcomes of the process. The limitation of the “success” of the talks 
to the PKK’s withdrawal beyond the borders and laying down arms 
shows that the government’s approach to the essence of the problem 
is not fundamentally different than that of the military. The PKK and 
the armed conflict are certainly part of the Kurdish problem, but not 
all of it. After 30 years of struggle, the armed and civilian factions of the 
Kurdish movement expect much more than a government assurance 
that the military will cease its activities if/when PKK militants leave 
Turkish territories. Perhaps the most telling indication of this reality is 
Öcalan’s urge on the BDP deputies to continue to push for democratic 
autonomy, mother tongue education and collective rights as part of 
their work in the parliamentary commission on the new constitution. 
It is clear that the Kurdish political movement sees the realization of 
these goals as a precondition for a peace settlement with the state.
After decades of oppression, intimidation, exclusion and dismissal, 
the Kurdish political movement has become a key political player 
in Turkey’s democratization and peace process. What replaced the 
Kurdish political movement from the periphery to the centre of 
politics in Turkey were not only its decades of political, legal and 
armed struggle, but also an unanticipated turn of events. The strong 
societal support and demand for peace, the AKP’s absence of an 
alternative viable partner in peace, the indispensable role of the BDP 
in the constitution making process and the instability and transition 
in the Middle East have served to strengthen this position. Whether 
the “process” will actually lead to peace will depend on the willingness 
and ability of the Turkish government, media and society to come to 
terms with this new phenomenon and to accept the Kurds as equal 
partners in dialogue.
The transition of the Kurdish political movement from an outcast to 
the facilitator of peace stands in sharp contrast to the change in the 
role, perception and significance of Europe, which, within a matter of 
one decade, has lost its pivotal role in Turkey’s democratization process 
and the solution of the Kurdish question. Having lost its soft power 
over the Turkish government and legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurds, 
the European political and legal institutions are virtually sidelined 
from the process where the parties are searching for a “home grown” 
peaceful settlement. While the EU is caught up in an existential crisis 
and the ECtHR is preoccupied with easing its workload, the Kurds and 
the Turks are writing a new history. It looks like this time Europe will be 
an onlooker rather than an agent of political change.
12 While introducing a number of positive changes in the name of executing the 
ECtHR judgments, the draft package does not include any amendments to the 
definition of “membership or leadership of terrorist organizations”, which are the 
principal crimes that the KCK defendants are charged with.
